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ABSTRACT 
The deployment of smart-card-based public transit fare payment 
systems provides government the opportunity to create a valuable 
derivative data product. Companies such as Urban Engines have 
demonstrated an ability to add value to the data derived from transit 
fare transactions. The challenge for the public sector is to, for the 
societal good, leverage private sector interest by giving access to 
useful fare transaction data in a manner that protects customer 
privacy. This challenge is particularly acute in California, where 
privacy laws make sharing data in a manner that supports the public 
interest difficult. This paper presents the Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission’s (MTC’s) proposed solution to the 
problem. MTC operates the Clipper® transit fare payment system 
for the San Francisco Bay Area. In an effort to share usable data 
that protects customer privacy, MTC developed an anonymizing 
scheme that is the subject of the present paper. We seek feedback 
on our approach from the Data for Good Exchange community, 
asking: in seeking a balance between customer privacy and 
usability, does the scheme go too far in either direction? And, 
should we take a different anonymizing approach? 
1.INTRODUCTION 
The Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) is the 
transportation planning, financing, and coordinating agency for the 
nine-county San Francisco Bay Area – the San Francisco Bay 
shoreline comprises San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, 
Alameda, Contra Costa, Solano, Napa, Sonoma, and Marin 
Counties. MTC began an effort to introduce a single fare payment 
system across the many transit operators that serve the region in 
1998. Today the Clipper® card can be used on twenty Bay Area 
transit providers. The service handles around 800,000 transactions 
each week day and settles over $40 million dollars each month.  
As noted above, in addition to operating Clipper®, MTC serves as 
the region’s transportation planning agency. As the Clipper® card 
gained wider adoption, the transportation planners at MTC sought 
detailed transaction data to better understand the travel behavior of 
Bay Area residents. Around the same time, private sector interest 
in the data increased, in particular from the firm Urban Engines, 
who sought the data to support their software business. To MTC’s 
planners, the highest value aspect of the Clipper® transaction data 
is individual trajectories through the transportation network. This 
data has the potential to reveal interesting and important behaviors, 
including preference for rail (rather than bus), disdain for 
transferring, seasonal variation, and day-to-day route variation. 
Importantly, MTC’s planning staff did not want to be the sole 
customers of the prospective Clipper® data product. Rather, we 
sought to create a product that was useful to us that we could share 
with others.  
Though housed in the same agency, California’s privacy laws – 
California Streets and Highways Code Section 31490 in particular 
– make sharing the data complicated. MTC’s planning, Clipper®, 
and legal personnel set about on an effort to create a useful data 
product that protected customer privacy and could be broadly 
distributed. The remainder of the paper describes our work. 
2.PROBLEM 
MTC sought to share useful Clipper® data in a manner that protects 
customer privacy. In this case, the primary customers of the data, 
MTC’s planners, defined “useful” as containing individual 
trajectories through the transportation network across a full day, 
with each day in each year represented in the data. California’s 
privacy laws governing electronic payment systems require that 
any data product that can be shared with MTC’s planners can be 
shared more widely (i.e., MTC’s planners receive no preferential 
access), in particular with private sector actors interested in 
leveraging the data for business ventures.  
3.SOLUTION 
MTC’s planning, Clipper®, and legal teams iteratively 
experimented with solutions that attempted to balance protecting 
customer privacy and retaining the data’s usefulness. We were 
guided by our collective judgment and settled on the following 
anonymizing scheme: 
- All personally identifiable information is held in a separate 
database that was not joined, examined, or considered as 
part of our effort and no personally identifiable information 
is present in the anonymous data. 
- Each Clipper® card’s unique serial number is replaced with 
a pseudo-random identification field that persists for a 
single “circadian” day – the data is separated from 3 am to 
3 am, as this represents a more logical interval of transit 
movements than from midnight to midnight. The 
persistence of the random ID through the day allows for the 
analysis of a full day’s movement through the transportation 
network. 
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- A sample of 50 percent of unique cards is selected for each 
circadian day. This obscures habitual behavior that, when 
deviated from, may suggest (when the habitual movements 
are very uncommon) individual travel patterns – confirming 
patterns and/or the identity of specific individuals would 
require other (e.g., observation, a personal relationship, 
etc.) information. For example, if a single card makes a 
unique movement each day, the absence of that movement 
could reveal characteristics of a customer the customer may 
not want publically known. 
- Of the four or five Mondays in a month of data, three are 
randomly selected. The same approach holds for each day 
of the week. This further obscures habitual patterns. When 
the card sampling and day-of-week sampling is combined, 
each card has a (0.50 * 3/5 = ) 30.0 to (0.50 * 3/4 = ) 37.5 
percent chance of being included in each daily data set, 
which means the chance of a single card being selected for 
a full work week is less than (0.375^5 = 0.7%) one percent. 
The day-of-week field is retained, which facilitates day-of-
week-specific analyses (e.g., are Mondays different than 
Wednesdays?).  
- Each date is replaced with a unique, random number. The 
combination of year (which is retained), month (also 
retained), day-of-week, and unique date number allows for 
the identification of transactions which occurred on a single 
day, while obscuring the identity of the exact day. This 
suppression reduces the possibility of pairing surveillance 
video with the data to identify individual travelers.    
- Each time stamp is truncated to the nearest 10 minutes. This 
further reduces the likelihood of pairing the data with 
surveillance video to identify an individual. To maintain the 
correct sequence of transactions that occur within 
identically-labeled time intervals, a trip sequence identifier 
is added to the data. This identifier simply counts trips in 
temporal order made during the circadian day.  
Table 1 on the following page presents the full data schema. 
Each individual requesting the data must sign a non-disclosure 
agreement prior to working with the data; the form can be found 
here: https://mtcdrive.box.com/anonymous-clipper. Among other 
provisions, the agreement prohibits users from attempting to 
identify individuals with the data. 
3.1.INITIAL CRITICISMS OF THE FORMAT 
MTC staff solicited criticisms of the data product from internal and 
external users.  These observations included the following: 
- Replacing card unique serial numbers with an identifier that 
only persists for a 24-hour period limits use of the data to 
identify trends over multiple days in a week, such as the use 
of a card by weekly commuters traveling to local airports, 
or on parallel systems. 
- Obfuscation of the date was critiqued in two ways. First, 
some users were explicitly interested in seeing variations in 
ridership on days that saw special events, such as station 
closures or large sporting events. Second, users suggested 
that it might be straightforward to reverse the exact date 
obfuscation using outside data sources. 
- The limitations of route information surprised some users 
who were expecting to see route information for each 
transaction (only select transit providers configure the 
payment system to record route). 
- The monthly data sets, which contain about seven million 
transaction records, are too large for many users.  
3.2.SUCCESS TO DATE 
To date, 18 months of data, each containing the aforementioned 
seven million transaction records, have been distributed to about 20 
users. The scheme and resulting usability of the data was the subject 
of a paper presented at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the 
Transportation Research Board (Erhardt, 2016).  
4.CONCLUSION 
We have brought this paper to Data for Good Exchange to both 
share our work and get feedback from the community. Specifically, 
we seek to learn the following: 
- Are attendees aware of other efforts to create open, 
transaction-scale, anonymized transit fare payment data? 
- Do you think our data is useful?  
- Did our anonymizing scheme go too far in obscuring the 
data in the name of protecting customer privacy? Or not 
far enough? 
- Should we exchange different sampling and obfuscation 
tools in the anonymization process? For example, would 
you prefer to see a smaller sample size and more accurate 
time information? Or the other way around? 
- Should we approach anonymizing in a different manner? 
- Are you aware of anonymizing standards in this or other 
spaces that we could use to guide our efforts? 
- Do you see value in developing an anonymizing standard 
in this space?  
4.1.MOVING FORWARD 
We see a business need for a smarter, automated connection 
between all manner of databases that contain sensitive information 
and end users seeking anonymized and/or aggregations of said data 
that do not contain sensitive information. We think this can be 
accomplished by first exposing the full database schema and 
sample data to end users and allowing users to create queries – from 
the full dataset – extracting the information they seek. Intelligent 
interfaces can then assess the queries and resulting data for the 
likely presence of sensitive information, with human intervention 
triggered when the likelihood exceeds some threshold. This human 
intervention could be used to further train the intelligent interface. 
Such an approach would remove the types of “usability” 
assessments made by us in the present paper and allow for more 
efficient delivery of useful data to a broader array of stakeholders.  
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Table 1: Schema for Anonymized Data 
Field Name Data Type Example Description 
ClipperCardID varbinary D88268EA105… Anonymized Clipper® card identifier 
TripSequenceID int 2 Circadian Day Trip Sequence 
AgencyID int 1 Transit Agency Integer 
AgencyName char AC Transit Transit Agency Name 
RouteID int 300 Route Integer 
RouteName char F Route Name 
FareAmount money 0 Fare 
PaymentProductID int 119 Payment Product Integer 
PaymentProductName char AC Transit Adult local pass Payment Product Name 
TagOnTime_Time time 17:30:00 Boarding Tag Time 
TagOnLocationId int 2 Boarding Tag Location Integer 
TagOnLocationName char Transbay Terminal Boarding Tag Location Name 
TagOffTime_Time time 20:20:00 Alighting Tag Time 
TagOffLocationId int 15 Alighting Tag Location Integer 
TagOffLocationName char Millbrae (Caltrain) Alighting Tag Location Name 
Year int 2013 Transaction Year 
Month int 10 Transaction Month (1 is January) 
DayOfWeekID int 4 Transaction Day of Week Integer 
DayOfWeek char Wednesday Transaction Day of Week Name 
RandomWeekID int 6 Random Integer that Identifies a Unique Day 
 
 
